Hearings and Reports on the Evacuation Claims Bills

              cooperative  to  sign a waiver  of  ownership  claims   on buildings, underground  irrigation pipes,  and   the  like,   so that  all  property  not readily .
movable  had  to be abandoned.    About   20 families  of the   cooperative moved
to the  Central Valley and  leased  land  in Military Area No.  2, where,
according  to all  indications  in early March,   they would  be permitted to
farm throughout the war.     In five months the  Army announced the  California
portion of Area No.  2 would  also  be evacuated and in July the members
of the  cooperative  again lost heavily in liquidating this  new investment.
A  specific case will   illustrate  the   nature  of the   losses.    Masao
Hirano  (all  names  are  fictitious),   a 25-year-old Nisei,  his  elderly father,
his mother,   and  his  15-year  old brother,  had  operated 55 acres  in the
coastal  site.     They employed about   25 additional occasional workers and
had realized a net income   of about   $2000 a year over  a period of several
years.    When the  cooperative moved in February,  they had to abandon the
house,   garage,  and packing   shed  (estimated at  a total value  of $2300) which
they had built  on the  leased  land,  their  underground pipe and irrigation
equipment   (valued at  $1000),  a  crop  of peas  they expected to harvest and
sell  for  |3000 in a few weeks,   less mature crops  of tomatoes and  beans,
and about $1300 worth of farm tools  and  fertilizer which they were unable
to sell   or to move  to the new location.     The  cooperative  sold  some  of its
tractors  and  the Hiranos   took a $700 loss  in their  equity in the  equipment
and $350 in selling their horses.     They  sold  their 1940 pickup and  1936
truck at  25^ below Blue Book value,  entailing  an additional   loss  of $300.
Household   furniture,  some  tools,   and   the   family passenger   car were  taken
to  the  new location and the   cost of moving was   $300.    When Area No.   2 was
evacuated  in July,   the  Hiranos were  able to store  only a part of their
household furniture.     They  lost  $300 on furniture,   $100  on tools,   five
months of labor,  and  all their  savings   ($500) which they had invested  in
this  new venture.     In selling  their  car they  lost $400.     Not  including
bad debts  and insurance  losses,  their total  assets   of  at  least $10,550
were wiped  out.     The  Hiranos  did not have the   financial  resources to
attempt  relocation and   left the  camp  only when it  was mandatory in the
fall  of 1945.    Based  on non-inflated pre-war earnings they would have
earned in this  period  an additional $6000.
As   indicated by the  above  case,   administrative  defects and  the
general  circumstances  of evacuation made  substantial  losses  inevitable
even for  persons who were   sophisticated in business  enterprise.     The bulk
of the population,  however, was  in no way  equipped   to make  aggressive
adaptations,  and for  thorn there was  no  second  round.
Even when voluntary movement was prohibited and  the   controlled
evacuation was actually under way  late  in March,   the  agencies  responsible
had  inadequate authority and  power to  provide   for  the protection of
property,  and what powers  they had were   inadequately implemented and
gingerly exercised.
There was  a rough division of  responsibility between the  Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the   Federal Security Agency.     The
former was   charged with those   problems  pertaining to business and domestic
and personal  property.    The   latter  dealt with farm problems.     The   Federal
Security Agency had a dual  function and   a  divided responsibility.     The
Secretary of the   Treasury,   in delegating power  to  FSA,   set first the
protection of evacuee interests,  and  second the maintenance  of productivity,
but  General DeY/itt did  npt make the same  emphasis,  and   the  actual  operation
of the  FSA placed  continuing production first  and  the protection of evacuee
equity second.     Its policies  in collections  on loans   emphasized neither
of these  important functions.
The  Federal  Reserve Bank of San Francisco  on March  18 was   given
the  power  to  "freeze"  the property  of any evacuee  in order  to  "forestall
unfair action by unscrupulous   creditors.. .and  to minimize his   (the
evacuee's)  losses  in connection with the disposition of his  property."
(italics  supplied.     Press  release of March 18,   Exhibit E in Rep or t of
the  Federal  Reserve  Bank...on its  Operations  in  Connection with Evacuation...)    The freezing  authority was  retained  in the hands   of the  Federal
Reserve Bank in San Francisco and  never delegated to  the  field  offices,
7.