Hearings and Reports on the Evacuation Claims Bills

              Now that the  fears which accompanied  and were  engendered by our
initial  lack  of preparation for war  have  been dispelled  and the  war  is
successfully terminated, the  prior   statements   of the   highest Government
officials,   including   the Attorney General,   to the  effect that there was
no sabotage or  espionage by persons   of Japanese  ancestry  on the West
Coast,  are  completely accepted.     It is  no   longer suggested  that our
population of  Japanese  ancestry was an actual serious   threat to national
security.     Even at the   time of  the evacuation there was  no determination
by the  Government that persons of Japanese  ancestry were  an actual  threat
of espionage or  sabotage.     President Roosevelt,   in Executive  Order  9066,
did not find that persons of Japanese ancestry constituted any threat
of espionage  or sabotage but merely authorized military commanders  to
deal with the problem as  they deemed necessary  or desirable.    Similarly,
Secretary of War Stimson made  no  finding justifying  evacuation but merely
delegated authority to the  coastal military commanders.     Congress,   in
enacting the Act of March  21,   1942,  making it a misdemeanor to violate
an evacuation order,   left the   creation and  evacuation of military areas
entirely to military  commanders.
The  local military commander  on the West   Coast,  General'DeWitt,
based evacuation orders   on the extremely narrow finding of possible
espionage and sabotage  in connection with a possible   attempted invasion
of the West   Coast.     Of  course,   persons of Japanese ancestry  on the West
Coast  could  not  be  charged with responsibility for the  possibility of
invasion of the   Coast by enemy troops.    We  now know that such an invasion
was  not in fact included among the   actual battle  plans   of the  Japanese
high command and therefore  there was no  actual   objective basis  for  the
evacuation.     It was entirely a matter  of the military  authorities  taking
every possible precaution against remote possibilities.
The   local  commander was charged with responsibility for defending
the West  Coast and at  the  time,   in our  state  of unpreparedness,   sufficient
troops and  equipment for the  task were  not available.     Faced with the
possibility,  even though a remote possibility,   of actual  invasion of the
West  Coast by enemy troops,  he  sought to take every possible precaution
in view of our weak defenses.     One extreme precaution which the   local
commander was able  to undertake  and  which unfortunately he apparently
thought would be  helpful in dealing with the military situation and with
the very strong demands  of the  frightened West  Coast population for  every
possible  available protection, was  the  evacuation of  all  American  citizens
and  other persons   of Japanese  ancestry who had  the misfortune  to bear a
racial relationship to  one  of  our   enemies  and who did not have  the  political strength to resist being  the   victims  of an extreme precautionary
measure.     In short,   events have  conclusively established  that the  American
citizens  and other persons   of Japanese ancestry  on the West Coast were
evacuated not because of  any group  disloyalty but  simply because  of   the
chance  that  our  undefended condition might  invite  invasion and  the  further
chance  that some   individuals  among this  group  of our  population might be
tempted to aid  the possible invader.
2.     Legal aspects  of the  evacuation -     In Korematsu v. United States,
decided at  the   height of Tto stilities  on December  18,   1944,   even the
majority of the  Supreme   Court,  upholding  the   constitutionality  of an
evacuation order,  recognized the   grave   constitutional  questions  presented
by evacuation of American citizens  solely on the  basis  of racial ancestry
and would  go no further than  to rule  that  the military authorities
might possibly be  justified  in their  action in the   extreme   situation
which resulted after the   destruction of  the   fleet at Pearl  Harbor  and
in March  1942 when the   evacue ti on was  ordered.     The majority opinion
concluded as follows:     "We  cannot  — by availing  ourselves   of the  calm
perspective  of  hindsight — now say at that time   that  these actions were
unjustified".    At the  present  time,  however,  the   Congress may avail
itself  of the   calm perspective of hindsight and determine  that  since the
evacuation was  in fact unjustified, partial  restitution is  appropriate.
Moreover,  the   minority of the   Court in the   Korematsu   case  in forceful
opinions  indicated the  extreme  exercise  of governmental power  to which
American citizens  of  Japanese  ancestry were subjected by the evacuation
90.